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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA ANN FARLEY,
Plamtiff-Respondent,

v.
ROSSE. FARLEY,

Civil No.

10567

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action, and the matter specifically
before this Court on appeal is the modification of the original divorce decree.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, Judge Aldon J. Anderson presiding,
granted a motion made by Respondent to modify the original divorce decree. The modification granted a vested remainder in the subject real property to Respondent.
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NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, Ross E. Farley, seeks to have the decree of modification reversed and to have the action dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The original decree.
On October 3, 1958, Judge Aldon Anderson of the
Third Judicial District, State of Utah, issued a divorce decree which provided for alimony, custody of the children,
visitation rights, and property settlement between the Plaintiff below, hereinafter called "Respondent" and Defendant
below, hereinafter called "Appellant". As a part of the
provision for the minor children of Respondent and Ap·
pellant, the Court placed certain real property in trust to
the Respondent as Trustee for the children (R. 67). The ,
terms of the Trust were that the Respondent would hold i
said real property in trust for the children to cover their
support and education during their minority. The Decree
further provided :
"And she [Respondent] shall convey the corpus
of the trust estate and all accumulations and addi·
tions thereto in equal shares to said minor children,
or to the survivor of them, when the youngest at·
tains or would have attained the age of 18 years.
* * *" (R. 68).
The property to be distributed according to the terms
of such decree and trust, was ultimately determined to be
that property, located in Sacramento County, California,
described as follows :

I
~

"North half of Lots 1 and 3, Block 16, of Fair
Oaks tract, according to the official ~lat thereof
filed in the Office of the Recorder of Sacramento
County, California" (R. 73).
It should be noted by the terms of the decree said real

property was not included in the property settlement as
between Respondent and Appellant; rather, the property
was disposed of for the benefit of the minor children.

The California litigation.
Subsequent to the issuance of the Decree of October
3, 1958, both of the parties involved moved to the State of
California. On June 18, 1959, the Respondent filed an action in the Superior Court of the State of California in and
for the County of Sacramento to enforce the provisions of
the Utah divorce decree, (see page 1 of Exhibit D-5), and
to quiet her title to the property here involved. As part of
the relief demanded in such Complaint, Respondent prayed
as follows:
"For an order and decree declaring and adjudging that Plaintiff, as trustee for Ross Edward Farley, II and Barbara Susanne Farley, is the owner
of said real property described in said order modifying decree dated December 17, 1958, and described
in paragraph V of plaintiff's first stated Cause of
Action and that Defendants, or any of them, have
no right, title, estate or interest whatever in or to
said real property, and that Defendants, and all of
them, be forever debarred from asserting any claim
whatsoever in or to said real property adverse to
the Plaintiff" (Page 7 of Ex. D-5) .
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On August 11, 1959, Appellant filed an action in the
same California Court to quiet title to the same real prop.
erty which is here in dispute (See Page 87 of Ex. D-5).
The two actions thus filed were consolidated for trial in
November of 1959 (See page 37 of Ex. D-5).
The California trial court confirmed the divorce decree with the exception of paragraphs 7 and 8, which provided for the trust as described above and quieted Appellant's title in the real property subject to a lien upon said
real property for alimony and child support (See Ex. G).
This decree was in turn appealed to the District Court of
Appeal in and for the Third Appellate District for the
State of California. The opinion of the California appellate
court is included as Ex. B in the Record and might be summarized as follows:

1.

!

(a) The conveyance of the real property in trust,
during the minority of the children, was properly within
the Utah Court's jurisdiction and could not be collaterally
attacked in the Courts of California.
(b) The further provision in the Utah decree which
provided that upon the children's reaching their majority,
the property would be distributed to them, was beyond the '
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and was thus subject to
collateral attack in the State of California. In this regard,
the Court noted :
"We conclude that the award [Judge Ander·
son's October, 1958 Decree] exceeds the jurisdiction
of the Utah Court to the extent that it decrees trans·
fer of property or money to the children when they
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reach adulthood. The lack of jurisdiction appears
on the face of the Utah decree."
The final portion of the California decision concluded:
"We conclude that the Utah decree, so far as it
directed conveyance of the land, its proceeds or income, to the Defendant's children upon their reaching adulthood, exceeded the jurisdiction of the Utah
court, that it is vulnerable to collateral attack in
Utah and not entitled to full faith and credit in California" (See pp. 6 and 10 of Ex. D-4).
In accordance with the appellate court's decision, the
California trial court, upon remand of the case, issued a
modified decree and judgment which provided in essence
that the Appellant must forthwith convey the real property
in trust to the Respondent for the benefit of the minor
children during their minority. Appellant executed such a
deed on May 28, 1965 (Ex. D-11). The decree also provided
that after the children had reached their majority (in December of 1967), the trust should terminate and the Respondent should reconvey the property, or its remaining
proceeds to the Appellant as his sole and separate property
(See Ex. D-12).
The net effect of the California litigation, therefore,
was simply to grant a vested remainder in the trust property to the Appellant, after the children had reached their
majority.
The Utah litigation.

Once it appeared that the California litigation would
work to the ultimate benefit of the Appellant, Respondent

b

brought the case back before the Utah Court. This switch
of forums was initiated by a motion under date of March
11, 1965, which requested the Utah district court to modify
its original divorce decree (R. 164). One request made in
this Motion was for the Court to modify its Decree and
provide that the real property in dispute be awarded to Respondent as her separate property.
A hearing on the above Motion was ultimately held on
the 5th day of January 1966. There was no evidence presented to the Court other than that contained in the exhibits
on appeal pertaining to the California litigation. There
was no testimony or evidence as to the circumstances of
the parties, their present marital status, their present incomes or their present property holdings.
The Trial Court modified the decree in accordance
with Respondent's Motion, and ruled that the property
should be conveyed in trust for the benefit of the minor
children until their majority at which time the property
would be held free and clear by the Respondent (R. 204).
The net effect of this modification was to take the vested
remainder from the Appellant, as it had been granted to
him in the California litigation, and to grant the same to
the Respondent. She thus obtained in the order appealed
from a complete reversal of the California decree. It is
from this Order of the Trial Court, dated January 27, 1966,
that Appellant appeals to this Court.

1
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE
TO THE RESPONDENT, SINCE THE MATTER
HAS BEEN FINALLY AND COMPLETELY
ADJUDICATED PRIOR TO SAID AWARD
AND IS RES JUDICATA.
The first contention on this appeal concerns the effect
of the California litigation upon the power of the Utah trial
court to make the disposition here in question. For purposes of clarification, the pertinent decrees of the Utah and
California courts might be summarized as follows:
( 1) Original Utah Divorce Decree of 1958:
Property to wife as trustee for children during their
minority, remairnder to children.
(2)
1965:

California Decree (as modified on appeal) of

Property to wife as trustee for children during their
minority, remainder to husband.
(3)
1966:

Utah Decree on motion to modify granted in

Property to wife as trustee for children during their
minority, remainder to wife.
It is the last of these decrees which is here in question.

The position of the Appellant is simply that the property
was dealt with and disposed of in the California litigation;

that such a disposition is res judicata in California; and
that the Utah trial court was precluded from rendering the
third decree above mentioned, by virtue of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. This
argument is augmented in the following subpoints :

The parties to this action have litigated
their respective rights to the subiect property in
the California courts.
(a)

After the rendition of the 1958 Utah Decree, both parties moved to California, Respondent there filed suit asking,
inter alia, for the following relief:
( 1) For an order establishing the Utah Decree in California "with the same force and effect
as if said Decree * * * had been granted by
this Court" (Ex. D-5, p. 6).
(2) For an order quieting title in the property
to Respondent as trustee for the children (Ex. D-5,
p. 7).
(3) For an order appointing a receiver to take
possession of the subject property and ordering a
sale of such property. (Ibid.)
Appellant likewise filed a complaint in California to quiet
his title to the subject property (Ex. D-5, p. 87). The two
actions were ultimately joined for trial on the merits.
The question thus raised is just what was litigated in
the California actions. It seems clear that the California
litigation was far more extensive than would be a sterile
judicial proceeding for the establishment of a divorce decree. This litigation was sufficiently involved with the

parties' marital rights and problems to raise traditional
concepts of res judicata in the subsequent Utah litigation.
Mere common sense will compel the conclusion that
when a divorced husband and wife bring cross quiet title
actions against each other concerning specific property,
they are in a very real sense litigating their marital rights
to such property. Moreover, the record itself demonstrates
that the parties, in California, raised additional marital
matters such as modification of alimony (Ex. D-5, p. 84);
modification of support (ibid.); and modification of visitation rights (ibid.).
In effect, the parties merely moved to California and
appealed to the courts of that State to resolve numerous
issues relative to their divorce. Of course, the State of California had a legitimate interest in such matters since both
parties resided in California and the situs of the property
is there as well. Since the parties did litigate their various
marital rights in California, it is presumed that they litigated their marital property rights as well. As stated in
Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 68, 291 Pac. 298 (1930):
"The settlement of property rights between the
parties is an incident to every decree of divorce
where there is any property involved."
Where the parties litigate custody, support, alimony
and visitation rights-as well as their respective rights to
the title of the property itself-they have clearly litigated
their marital rights to the property. Nor can it be claimed
that the California litigation was confined to the mechanical task of establishing, as a matter of law, the Utah divorce
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decree. Rather, the transcript (Ex. P-9) clearly shows tha!
the parties delved into every facet of their circumstances:
income, bills, expenses, employment, ad infinitum.
Further evidence of the extent of the California litiga.
tion appears in the text of the opinion by the California
Appellate Court (Ex. B). It demonstrates, too that Respondent requested affirmative relief concerning the property
in California :
"Plaintiff [Respondent] urges, nevertheless,
that she is entitled to a similar disposition at the
hands of the California courts as a matter of com·
ity" (Ex. B, p. 10).
The foregoing facts, together with this Court's clear
statement in Smith v. Smith, clearly demonstrates that, as
a matter of law, the parties did litigate their respective
marital property rights in the California litigation.

The determination of property rights by the
California Court is final and res judicata and
must be given Full Fa#h and Credit in the Courts
of this State.
(b)

Once it is established that the parties did litigate their
marital property rights in the State of California, the fur·
ther question becomes to what extent such litigation limits
the Utah trial court in making different provisions with
regard to the marital property rights of the parties. At
first blush, it might appear that the California litigation
would have no inhibiting effect upon the Utah trial court,
since in Utah, at least, property setttlements ostensibly can
be modified under Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5 (1953). If the
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same legal situation existed in California, it would appear
that the Utah trial court was within its discretion in modifying the California decree.
However, in determining the effect of the California
decree, the law of California and not that of Utah should
be applied. Unlike Utah, California does not allow the
modification of a divorce decree respecting marital property rights. Thus, for example, in the leading case of
Hough V. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P. 2d 15 (1945),
after noting that alimony and support decrees could be
modified, the Court said :
"This does not mean that payment under property settlement agreements may be modified even
though incorporated in the decree. They may not
. . . but in such a situation, there is not the same
underlying policy. The settlement of property r~ghts
should be final in order to secure stability of titles."
Similarly, in the case of Broome v. Broome, 231 P. 2d 171
(Cal., 1951), the Court noted:
"A divorce decree which establishes the property rights of the parties is not subject to modification without the consent of both parties ... When
an interlocutory judgment for divorce valid and
regularly entered, is not vacated, it becomes a final
judicial determination of the property rights of the
parties ... "
It follows that the California decree which granted a
vested remainder to the husband upon the children's reaching their majority, is a final judgment which cannot be

modified without the consent of both parties.
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Under settled principles of res judicata, as applied here
through the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United
States Constitution, such decree issued by the California
courts must be given the same effect here in the State of
Utah. 28 U.S. C. Section 1738 (1950), 62 Stat. 947 (1948).
As noted by Mr. Justice Dougles, in State ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 3'30 U. S. 610, 91 L. Ed. 1133 ,(1946):
"The general rule is that this command re·
quires the judgment of a sister state to be given
full, not partial, credit in the state of the forum."
The result is apparent. Since the property decree is final
and not subject to modification in California where it was
rendered, the State of Utah and its courts must give Full
Faith and Credit to such decree.
The ostensible authority of Utah courts to modify their
own property decrees is of course irrelevant to the question
at hand. It has been definitively established that, in de·
termining what effect should be given a foreign decree, the
applicable law is that of the state which rendered the decree and not that of the forum state. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 78 L. Ed. 269 (1933).
The finality of the California decree is not merely a
matter of California law. It is founded as well in sound
policy which has been previously adopted by this Court. In
the case of Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 Pac. 298
(1930), this Court was faced with a question which was
factually and legally identical to that involved in the in·
stant case. In the Smith case, the parties had obtained a
divorce in the State of North Dakota. Subsequently, an
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action was brought in Utah for an accounting with regard
to certain marital property rights. The defense was raised
that the matter had been finally adjudicated in North Dakota and was res judicata. This Court, after citing numerous authorities concerning the finality of divorce decrees,
stated as follows :
"What we hold is that under the evidence in
this case it is clear that the matters in issue between
the parties hereto were involved and might have

been raised and settled in the divorce case in North
Dakota." (Emphasis added.)

The Court concluded, therefore, that the matter was res
judicata and could not be relitigated. The instant case is
much stronger, for here, the issue not only "might have
been raised and settled" by the parties in the California
litigation, but indeed they actually litigated the issue. It
follows that the California decree should be given res judicata effect and should not have been modified by the trial
court below.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE
TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial Court did not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause in decreeing that
the real property should go to the children in trust, with
the remainder to Respondent upon their reaching majority,
it remains true that such disposition by the trial court was
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in violation of settled principles of Utah substantive law.
The following subpoints elaborate this contention:

Utah law precludes the modification of
a divorce decree, respecting property rights, where
such modification purports to dispose of properties not i..'ncluded in the property settlement of the
original decree.
(a)

In the original divorce decree, signed by Judge Anderson in 1958 (R. 65-68), the subject property was awarded
to the wife as trustee for the minor children, with the following provisions :
"And she shall convey the corpus of the trust
estate and all accumulations and additions thereto
in equal shares to said minor children, or to the
survivor of them, when the youngest attains or
would have attained the age of 18 years * * *"
(R. 68).
It is clear, therefore, that the property was not
awarded to either the husband or wife as a settlement of
marital property rights. It was awarded to the children
as a part of the child support provisions of the decree.

After the advent of the California litigation, which
voided that portion of the foregoing decree which gave the
remainder to the children, Respondent returned to Utah
and filed her Motion to modify the original Utah decree (R.
164). The relief sought through modification is spelled out
in paragraph 8 of said Motion (R. 68) as follows:
"In the alternative the Plaintiff requests the
Utah court to modify its decree entered herein to
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provide that said real property be awarded to the
Plaintiff as her separate property."
The trial court modified the decree in accordance with that
prayer (R. 195 et seq.).
What the Utah trial court did was to include real property within the property settlement between the parties,
which property was not originally included in the property
provision of the 1958 divorce decree. The question presented, therefore, is whether the Court may "modify" the
original property settlement of the parties, as incorporated
in the 1958 decree, by adding thereto an additional property disposition in favor of Respondent. It is respectfully
submitted that the power to modify granted by Utah Code
Ann. 30-3 . . 5 (1953) is not so pervasive. A similar problem
was raised in the case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 362,
242 P. 2d 298 (1952), where as here, the wife sought to
modify the original divorce decree by claiming real property which had not been included in the original decree.
The court held, in a three-to-two decision, that upon a
showing of extrinsic fraud, such a modification would be
justified. (The two dissenting judges seemed to argue that
the matter should be laid to rest once and for all, notwithstanding the fraud.) Even the majority holding in the
Glover decision, however, would not sanction the modification here made by the trial court, since there was no allegation or proof with regard to the extrinsic fraud in the
trial court below. The conclusion thus compelled by the
Glover decision is that since there was no allegation of
fraud, and since the real property here in dispute was not
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included in the property settlement of the original decree,
but in the support provisions of such decree, the decree cannot now be modified to include said property within tM
property settlement.
An analogous limitation upon the trial court's right to
modify a divorce decree is found in the alimony cases,
wherein it has been repeatedly held that where no alimony
is allowed in the original decree, such decree cannot subsequently be modified to include alimony. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 89 Utah 5'54, 58 P. 2d 11 (1936); Cody V. Cody, 47
Utah 456, 154 Pac. 9152 (1916). From such decisions has
grown the traditional Utah practice of including alimony
of $1.00 per year to allow subsequent modification of the
alimony provisions upon the showing of changed circumstances.
The result seems apparent that, where the real prop·
erty was not included in the original property settlement,
it may not years later be included by a purported "modifi·
cation" of the original decree.

The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5, as allowing the modification of a property settlement in
only the most extreme and unusual circumstances
which circumstances do not exist in this case.
(b)

An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court
of Utah clearly indicates that 'Section 30-3-5 does not, in
the normal case, provide for the modification of a property
settlement. With regard to modification, that Section pro·
vides as follows :
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"Such subsequent changes or new orders may
be made by the Court with respect to the disposal
of the children or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and proper."
The concluding words of the quote suggest that both the trial
courts and the Supreme Court are vested with considerable
discretion in the modification of divorce decrees. However,
the Supreme Court decisions have clearly indicated that the
modification of property settlement "is reasonable and
proper" in only the most extreme and unusual cases. This
policy is supported by the desirability of stabilizing property titles, and by the general policy of res judicata.
It is true that in some Utah cases there is rather broad

dictum to the effect that a court has vast powers of modification. Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010
(1898); Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103
(1959). Neither of these cases, however, deals with the
modification of a property settlement and any discussion
in such cases with regard to modification of property settlements is purely dictum.
Other cases, in which modifications of property settlements have actually been before the Court, are much more
useful in analyzing the propriety of the modification in the
instant case. Thus, for example in the case of Callister V.
Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P. 2d 944 (1953), this Court
was faced with an identical problem to that here: Whether
or not a property settlement, incorporated in a divorce decree can be subsequently modified. In that case, an action
was brought by the husband to revoke payments and ali-
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mony he had been paying in pursuance of the decree. The
wife claimed that such payments were not subject to modification inasmuch as they constituted part of the property
settlement rather than alimony. In a discussion of this
defense, the Supreme Court cited with apparent approval
the California decision of Hough V. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605,
160 P. 2d 15. Quoting from that case, the Callister opinion
notes:
"This does not mean that payments under property settlement agreements may be modified even
though incorporated in the decree. They may not.
(Citing authorities.) But in such a situation there
is not the same underlying policy. The settlement
of property rights should be final in order to secure
stability of titles."
Upon further analysis, the Utah Supreme Court determined
that the payments sought to be modified were alimony and
not property setttlement payments and thus, could be properly modified. The clear implication of this decision is that
property settlements themselves may not be modified on a
mere showing of changed circumstances. If property settlements can be so readily modified under the authority of
Section 30-3-5, the Supreme Court in the Callister case
would not have gone to the difficulty of discussing the
question of whether it was an alimony or property decree
under consideration. The distinction between alimony or
property would be entirely superfluous unless it is true
that property settlements are not so easily modified as
alimony clauses.
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The same philosophy is articulated in Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P. 2d 1001 ( 1934). In that case,
on the question of modification of property rights in a divorce decree, this Court notes :
"At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
made and entered its order modifying the decree
of April 12, 1932, by reducing the alimony and refusing 'to entertain jurisdiction of the plaintiff's
petition to modify said decree so far as said petition
sought to modify the decree heretofore entered settling the property rights.' It is not found or indicated, nor is it disclosed by the record of the trial
court what reason the court had in mind for so refusing to entertain jurisdiction. No reason being
assigned, it may be assumed that the trial court
took the view that such iudgment was a final iudgment, and therefore not subiect to the rules relating
to interlocutory or alimony iudgments or iudgments
relating to custody of children, and was therefore
a final iudgment." (Emphasis added.)
Further on in the opinion, the Supreme Court confirms
such an assumption on the part of the trial court when it
states:
"Further, the judgment dividing the property
is based upon a contract, and no question of fraud,
good faith, undue influence, or overreaching is presented. The iudgment settling property rights is
final and a bar to any actfon afterwards brought by
either party to determine the question of property
rights" (84 Utah at 400). (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, such a holding would preclude modification of the
property settlement here, even if Respondent had shown
some material evidence of changed circumstances.
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Also instructive is the case of Glover v. Glover, 121
Utah 362, 242 P. 2d 298 ( 1952). In this case, the Court
held that a showing of fraud was necessary to include real
property in modifying a divorce decree which did not in.
elude such property originally.
Finally, the case of Smith, v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291
Pac. 298 (1930) is of interest. In that case the Court held
that the North Dakota property settlement of the marital
property rights of the parties, was res judicata and pre·
eluded subsequent action in the State of Utah. The fore·
going cases are not iconoclastic or in violation of Section
30-3...5. Such cases merely reflect the judicial policy that
a property settlement may not be modified unless unusual
grounds, such as fraud, mistake, or undue influence are
shown. Only in such cases will the modification be "reas·
ona;ble and proper" within the contemplation of 30-3-5.
Such a policy of nonmodification is followed in virtually
all states, and is stated to be the general rule :
"If, in settlement of property rights, a decree
provides .for a lump sum, or payments in install·
ments, or a transfer of property, it is generally held
that the award is final and is not subject to modi·
fication as the circumstances of the parties change"
24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §941.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
FOLLOW CALIFORNIA LAW IN DETERMINING THE DI'SPOSITION OF THE REAL PROPERTY HERE IN DISPUTE, SINCE THE SITUS
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OF ,SAID PROPERTY IS IN CALIFORNIA,
AND CALIFORNIA LAW MUST BE APPLIED.
Even assuming that the trial court had the jurisdiction to modify the decree and was not precluded from so
doing by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, nonetheless, it
is submitted that the modification was in error. The trial
court was faced with one basic question: Should the property settlement in the original decree be modified so as to
grant the real property to the wife, upon termination of
the minority of the children? In resolving this question, the
Court assumed that it had jurisdiction and power to effect
such a modification under Section 130-3-'5. It is submitted,
however, that since the real property, which was the subject of the modification, is located in the State of California, that the law of that state, rather than Utah law,
should have been applied in determining whether or not a
modification should have been allowed.
The issue does not concern merely the personal rights
of the parties. Rather, it affects basic property concepts
affecting real property located in the State of California.
Moreover, both parties to this litigation are residents of
California, their children are residents of that state, various witnesses and other persons who possess any interest
or knowledge in this case are located in California, and the
parties have subjected their rights to the Courts of the
State of California. It is apparent, therefore, that California has numerous contacts and interests in this litigation, but the State of Utah has practically no interest what-
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soever, aside from the fortituous fact that the original divorce decree was issued here.
The applicable choice of law doctrine is stated sue.
cinctly in the following quote from 16 Am. Jur. 2d 23, Con.
flict of Laws, Section 14:
"It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state within which it is situated, and
no interference with it by any other sovereignty
can be permitted. Therefore, all matters concerning
the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae,
which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
to it can pass from one person to another, or an interest therein of any sort can be gained and lost.
This general principle includes all rules which govern the descent, alienation, and transfer of such
property and the validity, effect, and construction
of wills and other conveyances."

This basic choice of law doctrine was early adopted in
Utah in the case of Conant Deep Creek v. Curlew Valley
Irrigation Company, 23 Utah 627, 66 Pac. 188 ( 1901). It
is also adopted in the American Law Institute, Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §214 et seq. This doctrine applies
with equal force to conveyances by operation of law and
transfers involving marital property. American Law In·
stitute, Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§223 and 237.
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court in de·
termining whether its original decree should have been
modified, should have looked to the law of California. Had
the Court done so, it is clear that the result would have been
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that no modification would be allowed. In California, a
property settlement is final and may not, under any circumstances, save fraud or consent of the parties, be modified. Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P. 2d 15 (1945);
Broome v. Broome, 321P.2d 171(Cal.,1951). Indeed, as
noted in the Hough case, California has a legitimate interest in securing "stability of title" to its real property. Such
interest will clearly be subverted if the law of Utah as interpreted by the Courts below, in the form of Section 303-5, is to prevail with regard to the disposition of California
real property.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE DECREE WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
Even if it be conceded that the trial court had the
power to modify the decree and was not precluded from so
doing by any of the foregoing defenses, it remains true
that such modification could only be made upon an allegation and showing of changed circumstances. The Utah law
on this point is profuse. Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 261,
225 Pac. 76 (1924); Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P. 2d
894 (1935); Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 P. 2d 198
(1943).
The only implication of changed circumstances raised in
Respondent's Motion to Modify was the discussion of the
California litigation (Tr. 164 and 165). And the effect of
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the California litigation was alleged by Respondent to be
a sufficient change in circumstances to justify the modifi.
cation (R. 192). Indeed, the trial court itself stated:
"Since the California Courts, within their
power so to act, have determined that there is an
invalidity concerning the disposition of the California property, it is the opinion of the Court that
the Court now has power to amend the prior divorce
decree ... " (Tr. 20).
Other than the effect of the California litigation, there was
no evidence presented whatsoever with regard to changed
circumstances. In fact, neither of the parties personally
appeared in Utah for the hearing of the motion.
The question thus presented is whether the California
decision is, itself, a sufficient change in circumstances to
justify the modification of the decree. An analysis of the
effect of the California decree clearly illustrates that it
presents no material change whatsoever. The original Utah
decree gave the remainder to the children-the wife was
given no interest in the property except as trustee for the
children. As far as the wife was concerned, therefore, the
California decree did not change her position since it
merely granted the remainder to the husband. The wife's
interest remained the same as under the Utah decree.
At best, the California decree has increased the husband's property holding by granting him a remainder to
the subject property. This, however, is a future interest
not to vest until December of 1967. It hardly creates any
present change in the circumstances of the parties which
would justify the modification.
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Such a minimal change hardly meets the criterion laid
down by the court in Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P. 2d
986 (1953) :
"The legal principle controlling in this case is
that a divorce decree may not be modified unless it
is alleged, proved and the trial court finds that the
circumstances upon which it was based have undergone a substanti'al change." (Emphasis added.)
The only change shown in the case is an in futuro increase
in Appellant's property holdings. There has been no evidence of increased need on the part of the wife, the present
income of the parties, their marital status, their obligations,
their expenses, or any of the other myriad facts which are
relevant to a modification proceeding. Clearly, such facts
are indispensable to a fair decision on modification.
No Utah decision can be found which supports a modification where the only showing of changed circumstances
consists of a future change in the husband's property holdings. To the contrary, the decisions reflect a policy requiring thorough analysis of both parties' circumstances before
any modification is allowed. See, e.g., Carson v. Carson,
87 Utah 1, 47 P. 2d 894 (1935). Moreover, this Court has
clearly stated that the required scope of inquiry in determining a property award must be bilateral-that is it must
encompass the abilities and needs of both parties. Foreman
V. Foreman, 111Utah72, 176 P. 2d 144 (1946). It is respectfully urged that the evidence before the trial court fell
wholly short of establishing any "substantial" change in the
parties' circumstances and thus the decree must be reversed.
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS THIS CASE ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
As has been noted, both parties to this case now reside
in California. Both have voluntarily litigated their respective claims in the California Courts. The children of the
parties reside in California. The real property here at issue
is located in the State of California. Witnesses who would
testify with regard to the value of the subject property, the
circumstances of the parties, and other relevant facts are
all located in California. And, California has a legitimate
and real interest in this proceeding since it is primarily re·
sponsible for the welfare and well being of its residents.
Utah, on the other hand, has no contacts whatsoever
with the case except for the remote, and rather fortituous
fact that in 1958 the parties resided in Utah and obtained
their original divorce decree here.

It was, therefore, urged at the trial court level (R.
223) and is urged again now that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should be applied and this case dismissed. That
doctrine is designed specfically for such a situation. As
noted in State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. District
Court, 139 Mont. 453, 365 P. 2d 512 (1961) :
"The purpose of the rule is to require litigants
to avail themselves of the trial forum of their resi·
dence and not burden the taxpayers and courts of
foreign jurisdictions with such causes."
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Certainly the State of Utah and its judiciary should not be
troubled with a cause which has no contacts whatsoever
with the forum, particularly where, as here, the parties
have a convenient and readily available forum in their home
state.
Another rationale for the doctrine is the prevention of
forum shopping by plaintiffs. Vargas v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., 44 N. J. Super. 536, 131 A. 2d 39 (1957). In the
instant case, Respondent returned to Utah only after the
California litigation had gone sour for her. This is forum
shopping in its most objectionable form and should not be
sanctioned by this Court.
The most obvious reason for applying the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is, as the name implies, that it is inconvenient for the parties to litigate an action in a jurisdiction which has no contacts with the matter. This is certainly true in the instant case, where the evidence required
for a full and fair hearing on the question of modification
would have to be transported to Utah at great cost and inconvenience to the parties. Forum non conveniens was invented to prevent this type of harrassment, and for this
reason, the case should have been dismissed by the trial
court. Star v. Berry, 25 N. J. 573, 138 A. 2d 44 (1958).
If the instant case does not present a proper setting
for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens, it is
difficult to conceive of a case which would be dismissed
under that rule. Certainly no case could have fewer contacts with the forum than does this.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted on the basis of the forego.
ing points, summarized below, that the modifying decree
of the trial Court below be reversed and that this action be
dismissed from the Courts of this State, because:

(1) The Courts of the State of California have fully
litigated the marital property rights of these parties to the
subject real property. Such litigation and the resultant
California decree are res judicata in the State of California
and must be given like effect in the Courts of this State
under both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Utah
case of Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 Pac. 298 (1930).
(2) Even assuming, arguendo, that the lower Court
could constitutionally act as it did, it erred in modifying
the property settlement of the original divorce decree be·
cause the property thus included in the property settlement
was not included in the original property settlement in the
1958 decree. Moreover, the decisions of this Court have
allowed modification of property settlements in only the
most extreme and unusual circumstances, which circumstances have not been shown to exist in this case.
(3) In determining whether to modify the property
settlement, the trial Court should have followed the law of
the State of California since the situs of the subject real
property is located in that State. The trial Court's failure
to apply California law was critical since California law
does not permit such modification as was granted by the
trial Court.
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( 4) The trial Court erred in modifying the original
decree without the benefit of either allegations or proof
with respect to a substantial change in circumstances of the
parties.
( 5) The trial Court erred in refusing to dismiss this
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens. This action
has no contacts with the State of Utah, and the parties have
a readily available forum in their home state to which they
have previously subjected this litigation.
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